DignITA Database

DATA: 12/06/2015

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

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Parr. 14, 27

DATA: 07/04/2015

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Cestaro v. Italy (En)

Cestaro c. Italia (It)

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DATA: 07/04/2015

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

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Ruling:

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, […] Holds that there was a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural head;

Reference to obligations of criminalization:

Paragraph 209: For an investigation to be effective in practice it is a prerequisite that the State has enacted criminal-law provisions penalising practices that are contrary to Article 3 (see Gäfgen, cited above, § 117). The absence of criminal legislation capable of preventing and effectively punishing the perpetrators of acts contrary to Article 3 can prevent the authorities from prosecuting violations of that fundamental value of democratic societies, assessing their gravity, imposing adequate penalties and precluding the implementation of any measure likely to weaken the penalty excessively, undermining its preventive and dissuasive effect (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, §§ 149, 153 and 166, ECHR 2003 XII; Tzekov, cited above, § 71; and Çamdereli, cited above, § 38; under Article 4, see, mutatis mutandis, Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, §§ 89, 112 and 148, ECHR 2005 VII).

Reference to human dignity:

paragraph 177. In the present case, the Court cannot overlook the fact that according to the Court of Cassation the violence at the Diaz-Pertini School of which the applicant was a victim had been perpetrated “for punitive purposes, for retribution, geared to causing humiliation and physical and mental suffering on the part of the victims”, and that it could qualify as “torture” under the terms of the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (see paragraph 77 above).
paragraph 178. Furthermore, it transpires from the case file that the police officers kicked the applicant and struck him with tonfa-type truncheons, which the appeal judgment described as potentially lethal (see paragraph 68 above), and that the applicant had been repeatedly hit on different parts of his body.
The blows received by the applicant caused multiple fractures (to the right ulna, the right styloid, the right fibula and several ribs), leading to a four-day stay in hospital, over forty days’ unfitness for work, a surgical operation during his stay in hospital and a further operation a few years later, all of which left the applicant with a permanent weakness in his left arm and leg (see paragraphs 34-35 and 155 above). The ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant has therefore had severe physical consequences.
Nor should the applicant’s feelings of fear and anguish be underestimated. Having found accommodation in a night shelter, the applicant was awakened by the noise caused by the police storming the building. In addition to the blows which he received, he witnessed several security officers beating other occupiers of the building for no apparent reason.
In that connection, regard should also be had to the conclusions reached by the domestic courts in the framework of the criminal proceedings, with which the Government declared their broad agreement: according to the first-instance judgment, the conduct of the police inside the Diaz-Pertini School constituted a clear violation of the law, “of human dignity and of respect for the individual” (see paragraph 51 above); according to the appeal judgment, the officers systematically beat those inside the building in a cruel and sadistic manner, acting like “violent thugs” (see paragraphs 67 and 73 above); the Court of Cassation mentioned “egregious” violence of the “utmost gravity” (see paragraph 77 above).
In their observations before the Court, the Government themselves described the actions of the police in the Diaz-Pertini School as “very serious and deplorable acts”.
paragraph 179. In sum, it cannot be denied that the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant “caused severe pain and suffering and was particularly serious and cruel” (Selmouni, cited above, § 105, and Erdal Aslan, citéd above, § 73).

DATA: 12/02/2015

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

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Paragrafo operativo 17

DATA: 26/01/2015

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

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Guidelines 13, 16, 17, 18

DATA: 13/01/2015

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

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Ruling:
The Court, unanimously:
1. Joins to the merits the Government’s objections that the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 is incompatible ratione materiae and ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and dismisses them
2. Declares the applicant’s complaint under Article 8, in so far as it relates to the removal of her deceased husband’s tissue without her consent, and the complaint under Article 13 admissible and the remainder of the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention inadmissible;
3. Declares the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 admissible;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;6. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;7. Holds (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 16,000 (sixteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Reference to obligations of criminalization:

Indirect reference made in Article 1 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.

Reference to human dignity:
Par. 60. The applicant complained in substance under Article 8 of the Convention, firstly, that the removal of tissue from her husband’s body had been carried out without his or the applicant’s prior consent. Secondly, she complained that ‒ in the absence of such consent ‒ his dignity, identity and integrity had been breached and his body had been treated disrespectfully.
Par. 133
115. Treatment is considered to be ‘degrading’ within the meaning of Article 3 when it humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or when it arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance.
118 Respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the Convention.
Par. 142; … The object of these treaties is to protect the dignity, identity and integrity of “everyone” who has been born, whether now living or dead (see paragraph 37 above). As cited in paragraph 133 above, respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the Convention; treatment is considered “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention when, inter alia, it humiliates an individual, showing a lack of respect for human dignity.

DATA: 24/09/2014

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Ruling:

The court, unanimously, declares the complaints concerning Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention admissible. It holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

Reference to obligations of criminalization:

No direct references to obligations of criminalization.
(paragraph 97: the court cannot find that the applicable Latvian law was formulated with sufficient precision of afforded adequate legal protection against arbitrariness).

Reference to human dignity:

The court mentions as a relevant provision article 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, stating that: “Parties to this Protocol shall protect the dignity and identity of everyone and guarantee, without discrimination, respect for his or her integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to transplantation of organs and tissues of human origin” (paragraph 30).

It is also worth mentioning the concurring opinion of judge Wojtyczek, stating that: “there is no doubt that the applicant’s human rights were affected and infringed. In my view, protection of family life under Article 8 of the Convention encompasses the right to respect for the dignity of a deceased close relative. In particular, a mother may legitimately claim the right to respect for the dignity of her deceased son”. (pag. 31) The judge criticizes the Court’s ruling for its lack of precision, noting that it fails to specify how the right to respect for private and family life, protected under Article 8 of the Convention, has been violated.

DATA: 12/08/2013

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

Non attuata dall’Italia

NOTE:

Artt. 3 – 8

DATA: 12/08/2013

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

NOTE:

Arts. 3 – 8

DATA: 20/07/2012

STRUMENTI CORRELATI:

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Ruling:

For these reasons, the Court […] By fourteen votes to two, Finds that the Republic of Senegal, by failing to submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, has breached its obligation under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984.

Reference to obligations of criminalization:

Paragraph 74. Although, for the reasons given above, the Court has no jurisdiction in this case over the alleged violation of Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Convention, it notes that the performance by the State of its obligation to establish the universal jurisdiction of its courts over the crime of torture is a necessary condition for enabling a preliminary inquiry (Article 6, paragraph 2), and for submitting the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 7, paragraph 1). The purpose of all these obligations is to enable proceedings to be brought against the suspect, in the absence of his extradition, and to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention, which is to make more effective the struggle against torture by avoiding impunity for the perpetrators of such acts.
Paragraph 75. The obligation for the State to criminalize torture and to establish its jurisdiction over it finds its equivalent in the provisions of many international conventions for the combating of international crimes. This obligation, which has to be implemented by the State concerned as soon as it is bound by the Convention, has in particular a preventive and deterrent character, since by equipping themselves with the necessary legal tools to prosecute this type of offence, the States parties ensure that their legal systems will operate to that effect and commit themselves to co-ordinating their efforts to eliminate any risk of impunity. This preventive character is all the more pronounced as the number of States parties increases. The Convention against Torture thus brings together 150 States which have committed themselves to prosecuting suspects in particular on the basis of universal jurisdiction.
Paragraph 76. The Court considers that by not adopting the necessary legislation until 2007, Senegal delayed the submission of the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. […]
Paragraph 94. The Court considers that Article 7, paragraph 1, requires the State concerned to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, irrespective of the existence of a prior request for the extradition of the suspect. That is why Article 6, paragraph 2, obliges the State to make a preliminary inquiry immediately from the time that the suspect is present in its territory. The obligation to submit the case to the competent authorities, under Article 7, paragraph 1, may or may not result in the institution of proceedings, in the light of the evidence before them, relating to the charges against the suspect.